. These results suggest that in times of crisis the European Union can draw on mass public support as a source of resilience.
Introduction
In 2008, the European Union (EU) entered a severe economic recession. A serious crisis in the Eurozone followed less than two years later. These events put the European Union under great pressure. They even threatened to break up one of the major achievements of European integration -the common European currency. As the economic and monetary crisis unfolded, more and more voices questioning membership in the EU emerged across Europe. These voices were echoed by a growing popularity of Eurosceptic political parties (Usherwood et al., 2013; Duff, 2013) . These developments have raised concerns about the resilience of the supranational political regime in Europe. Is the European Union resilient enough to weather a major economic crisis? Mass public political support is an important source of resilience for political regimes.
One particular type of support -diffuse support -contributes to regime stability during difficult times such as economic crises (Easton, 1965) . I therefore address the concerns about European Union's resilience to crises by investigating the following question: How "diffuse" is support for the European Union?
The question about diffuse support for the European Union relates to a theoretical distinction between two types of political support: specific and diffuse. While specific support is a "running-tally" type of attitude that fluctuates according to the political regime's performance, diffuse support is an affective attitude. Diffuse support persists even in times when citizens become dissatisfied with the regime's policies (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999; Harteveld et al., 2013) .
The theoretical distinction between specific and diffuse support is important in assessing the resilience of political regimes (Easton, 1965; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011) . If political support for a regime is largely specific, then an event such as an economic crisis threatens the very survival of the regime. As the economic crisis brings hardships, citizens express negative evaluations of the regime's performance and these, in turn, decrease political support. If, on the other hand, a regime enjoys diffuse support, it can use this stable reservoir of support to weather the crisis. A European Union that commands diffuse political support is therefore much more resilient to crises than a Union that depends on specific support.
Although the scholarly literature shows a growing consensus that support for the European Union has diffuse characteristics (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014; Serricchio et al., 2013; Torcal et al., 2012a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004) , the empirical foundation for this consensus is rather limited. Virtually all evidence of diffuse support for the EU in the existing literature is based on cross-sectional comparative data. Diffuse support, however, is fundamentally a longitudinal phenomenon. It is defined as an individual's attachment to a political regime that persists through a crisis. The longitudinal dimension is therefore crucial in the study of diffuse support.
Although the existing research devotes some attention to the longitudinal dimension of support, it does so only at the aggregate level of analysis (Serricchio et al., 2013; Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014) . Aggregate-level studies, however, do not necessarily demonstrate the presence of diffuse support. Over-time stability at the aggregate level may mask instability at the individual level. We therefore need to demonstrate stability at the individual level in order to provide evidence of diffuse support for the EU. Due the focus on cross-sectional data, however, the existing literature fails to provide such evidence. It is the goal of the present paper to fill this gap.
I use a six-wave panel survey from the Netherlands to study over-time stability of support for the EU during the 2008 economic crisis.
1 I focus on political support for one of EU's institutions -the European Parliament. I find that although the economic crisis caused some variability in public support for the EU, levels of support at the individual level displayed a high level of stability throughout the period of the economic crisis. This level of stability even approached the level of stability in support for democracy, which is regarded as one of the most diffuse dimensions of political support (Norris, 1999; Norris, 2011 towards an object that represents the political system. The objects of citizens' support include the community of the political nation, the principles and institutions of the political regime, and the officeholders who represent these institutions (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999) . In this paper I focus on support for the political regime of the EU. I therefore define political support as support for EU institutions.
In order to determine whether political support provides legitimacy to a regime challenged by a crisis, it is important distinguish between two kinds of support: specific support and diffuse support (Easton, 1965; Dalton, 2004) . Specific support is a running-tally. Citizens adjust their level of specific support based on how satisfied they are with the current policy outputs of the political regime. Diffuse support, on the other hand, is independent of current regime performance. It is based on deeper, affective feelings. Diffuse support, therefore, does not fluctuate according to the current regime performance.
Given the different sources of specific and diffuse support, the two types of support differ in how stable they are over time, especially during times of crisis when citizens become dissatisfied with regime policies. While specific support changes over time as it is being updated in line with evaluations of regime performance, diffuse support remains stable (Easton, 1965; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011; Norris, 1999) . Although an extended period of low regime performance has the potential to affect diffuse support as well, over-time stability in the shortterm through a time of crisis is the key defining characteristic of diffuse support (Easton, 1965) .
A regime that enjoys diffuse support can therefore use this stable reservoir of support to weather a crisis. Such a regime is thus much more resilient to crises than a regime that depends on specific support.
Empirical studies of attitudes towards the European Union show that support for the EU takes both specific and diffuse forms. Some studies suggest that support for the EU has a specific component. Macroeconomic indicators such as the level of inflation or GDP influence support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007) . At the individual level, support for the EU correlates with citizens' perception of personal benefits from EU integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Mau, 2005; Torcal et al., 2012b) and with perceptions of the national economy (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Klingeren et al., 2013) . In addition, citizens whose occupations gain more from European integration express more support for the EU (Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2004) .
Another branch of research suggests that support for the EU has a diffuse component as well. Multiple studies find that individuals' feelings of European identity are a good predictor of support for the EU (Torcal et al., 2012a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Serricchio et al., 2013) . Since identity is an affective feeling (Sanders et al., 2012) , this evidence suggests that support for the EU is at least partly diffuse.
Although the literature provides some evidence suggesting that support for the European Union is diffuse (Serricchio et al., 2013; Torcal et al., 2012a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004) , this evidence is rather limited. Heretofore, all research demonstrating diffuse support for the EU is based on cross-sectional data. Diffuse support, however, is fundamentally a longitudinal phenomenon. It is defined as an individual's attachment to a political regime that persists through a crisis. The longitudinal dimension is therefore crucial in the study of diffuse support.
Although the existing research devotes some attention to the longitudinal dimension of support, it does so only at the aggregate level of analysis (Serricchio et al., 2013; Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014 Over-time stability in support is a relative term, however. Neither theoretical nor empirical works suggest that over-time stability in political support should be absolute (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Norris, 1999; Easton, 1965) . Political support is a mix of diffuse and specific components and the "diffusiveness" of political support for a particular object is thus a matter of degree (Norris, 2011) . In order to make the findings about diffuse support for the EU more informative, I put these findings in context. I compare support for the EU to two dimensions of political support at the national level. Existing research on political support at the national level suggests that certain dimensions of support are more diffuse than others (Norris, 2011) . Mass public support for democracy, for example, is among the most diffuse dimensions of political support (Norris, 2011 ). I therefore compare the level of over-time stability in support for the EU to over-time stability in support for democracy. In general, support for regime institutions is expected to be less diffuse than support for regime principles such as democracy (Norris, 2011) . I therefore expect support for democracy to be more diffuse (and thus more stable over time) than support for the institutions of the European Union.
H2: Support for the European Union is less stable than support for democracy.
Existing research on political support at the national level also shows that certain institutions within the national political system have lower level of diffuse support. Citizens' support for institutions is more vulnerable to performance evaluations when these institutions have closer connection to potentially controversial policies. The national government is an example of an institution that commands a lower level of diffuse support (Norris, 2011) . Support for the national government is less diffuse because the government only includes parties that are part of the winning coalition; opposition parties are excluded. Citizens' support for the government is therefore more volatile than support for institutions representing broader political views. Since the European Union represents a broader spectrum of political views than a national government, I expect support for the European Union to be more diffuse (and therefore more stable) than support for the national government.
H3: Support for the European Union is more stable than support for the national government.
As the discussion above shows, existing literature suggests that political support for the EU is specific to some degree (Klingeren et al., 2013; Torcal et al., 2012b; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Gabel, 1998 Klingeren et al., 2013; Gabel and Whitten, 1997) , I expect that there will be a positive relationship between evaluations of economic performance and support for the EU.
H4: There is a positive relationship between changes in evaluations of economic performance and changes in support for the EU.
This approach to the study of the relationship between performance evaluations and political support, however, differs from the approaches found in the existing literature. While existing literature examines the relationship from a static point of view, I take a dynamic approach to this relationship.
In the following sections, I examine these four hypotheses. The next section introduces data and variables. Then, I explore over-time stability in political support using the following three analytical tools: an aggregate-level analysis, a "Wiley and Wiley" model (Wiley and Wiley, 1970) , and a dynamic panel data model. While the aggregate-level analysis provides a basic assessment of over-time stability, the "Wiley and Wiley" model evaluates continuity in individual-level attitudes over time while controlling for possible unreliability in measurement.
The dynamic panel data model then complements the analysis by exploring whether individuals have a long-term level of support that they return to, after reporting an unusually high or low level of support. In addition, the dynamic panel data model examines how changes in evaluations of economic performance affect changes in political support.
In order to examine hypotheses 2 and 3, all three empirical sections (the aggregate-level analysis, the "Wiley and Wiley" model, and the dynamic panel data model) also explore overtime stability in two national-level attitudes: support for the national government and support for democracy. Each of the three empirical sections then compares the stability in these two national-level attitudes to stability in support for the European Union.
Data and variables
I use data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) Panel.
The LISS Panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in regular internet surveys. The panel is based on a true probability sample of Dutch households (Scherpenzeel and Das, 2010) . In this study, mass public political support for the European Union is the main concept of interest. I focus on one dimension of political support -support for regime institutions. Support for EU institutions is defined as citizens' confidence in the European Parliament. 3 Confidence in regime institutions is a well-established measure of support for a political regime (Torcal et al., 2012b; Norris, 1999; Easton, 1965 Klingeren et al., 2013; Gabel and Whitten, 1997) . In line with the existing research, I expect that there will be a positive relationship between evaluations and support for the EU.
Aggregate political support
This section provides an aggregate-level analysis of stability in political support. Compared to aggregate stability in confidence in the Dutch government and confidence in democracy, support for the European parliament displays slightly more over-time variation than support for democracy and somewhat less over-time variation than support for the Dutch government. Overall, the aggregate-level stability in support for the European Parliament through the economic crisis suggests that support for the European Union is more diffuse than specific.
[ Figure 1 about here]
There may be a concern, however, that the Dutch case significantly differs from the EU as a whole and that conclusions drawn from this analysis have only a limited application to the entire European Union. To address this concern, I use data from the Eurobarometer surveys to Since diffuse support is defined by over-time stability during crises, β !,!!! close to 0 would indicate a great deal of volatility in support, so much so that we would not be able to label such support as "diffuse."
Although in the study of attitude stability β !,!!! is most likely to fall into the 0 -1 range, [ Table 1 about here]
How diffuse is the support for the European Parliament in comparison to the two dimensions of political support at the national level? The results reported in columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 allow us to compare support for the European Parliament to support for the Dutch government (column 2) and to support for democracy (column 3). The results in column 2 of Table 1 (as demonstrated in Figure 1 ). Confidence in the Dutch government, therefore, has less over-time stability at the individual level than confidence in the European Parliament. In contrast, public support for democracy is highly stable over time (column 3 in Table 1 ). 
Individual-level analysis: Dynamics of political support
Dynamic panel data models are useful estimation tools for data with a large number of observations and a small number of time periods. These models focus on individual-level overtime changes. In particular, they model how rapidly momentary variations in an underlying disposition fade over time.
Dynamic panel data models are part of the family of lagged dependent variable models (Cameron and Triverdi, 2010) . The basic set up for a lagged dependent variable model is
where !" is the dependent variable, !,!!! is the lagged dependent variable, !" are the other regressors, ! is a fixed effect, and ε !" is the disturbance term. γ and β are regression coefficients.
The lagged dependent variable model is designed to address the problem of autocorrelation in the model's errors -a problem that often appears in analysis of panel data. The problem of autocorrelation in errors arises as observations are clustered within individuals (as we repeatedly measure each individual's attitudes over time). Since most conventional statistical models assume no autocorrelation in the error term, the presence of this autocorrelation threatens the consistency of the model's estimates (Roodman, 2009) .
Although the simple lagged dependent variable regression described in equation (2) , 2010) . A step towards getting around this problem is to estimate the model using first differences: is commonly used in panel data models (Prior, 2010; Wawro, 2002; Roodman, 2009) . I use the Arellano-Bond estimator for my dynamic panel data analysis.
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When using the Arellano-Bond estimator to assess over-time stability of attitudes, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable ( ) is the coefficient of interest. The coefficient indicates to what extent changes in the past level of political support affect the current level of political support. close to zero means that past changes in the level of support do not persist into the current time period. In other words, it means that if individuals report an unusually high or unusually low level of political support in one year, they quickly return to their long-term level in the subsequent year (Prior, 2010) . Since diffuse support is defined as support that persists during a time of crisis, a stable long-term level of political support during a financial crisis indicates that citizens have diffuse support for the EU.
The dynamic panel data model indicates a lack of stability in attitudes if (the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable) is close to 1. coefficient close to 1 indicates that deviations from the individual's long-term mean persist into the subsequent years and that individuals do not return to any stable level of political support. coefficient close to 1 will therefore suggest that individuals do not have a stable long-term level of political support and that support for the EU is rather specific than diffuse.
I assess the over-time stability of political support for the EU by estimating a simple Arellano-Bond model. Only the lagged dependent variable and a set of dummy variables for the years of the panel survey are included as predictors (Roodman, 2009; Prior, 2010) . 12 The results of this estimation are reported in the first column of Table 2 . The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is very close to zero (0.035). This indicates that when individuals deviate from their own long-term level of political support, this deviation does not persist and individuals quickly return to their long-term level of support. In other words, this result indicates that individuals have a long-term level of political support for the EU. Given that this stable long-term level of political support was observed during a major economic crisis, we can characterize support for the EU as diffuse.
[ Table 2 about here]
How does the long-term stability in political support for the EU compare to stability in the two dimensions of political support at the national level? The second and third columns in Table 2 
Concluding remarks
Diffuse political support gives political regimes legitimacy during times of crisis. This paper explored whether mass public support for the European Union is a diffuse type of support.
Although the existing literature provides some evidence suggesting that support for the European Union is diffuse (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2014; Serricchio et al., 2013; Torcal et al., 2012a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004) , this evidence is limited. All existing research demonstrating diffuse support for the EU is based on cross-sectional data. Diffuse support, however, is an attitude This study showed that public support for the EU maintained a high level of stability throughout the economic crisis. Although the crisis was responsible for some over-time variation in support for the EU, overall, individuals' support for the EU was highly stable. The over-time stability in support for the EU even approached the level of stability in one of the most diffuse dimensions of political support -support for democracy. Based on this evidence, I argue that public support for the European Union is largely diffuse.
The high stability of support for the EU throughout the 2008 recession implies that in times of crisis, the European Union can draw on mass public support as a source of resilience.
The results in this study also suggest that mobilization appeals challenging the supranational political regime in Europe may be limited in its ability to gain traction within the wider audience in the EU.
The conclusions from this study warrant a few caveats though. My analysis is based on data from only one EU member country -the Netherlands. The European Parliament". I compared percentages of respondents who indicated that they tend to trust the European Parliament. 6 The threshold of 20 points of less is based on standards used in other studies focusing on over-time stability of attitudes (Prior, 2010) . 7 Since there is only one indicator for each latent variable, the model requires a set of assumptions in order to become identified. These assumptions include: 1) The measurement error ! is uncorrelated with the latent variables ! ; 2) the measurement errors ! are serially uncorrelated; 3) the random shocks ! are serially uncorrelated; 4) the system is lag-1, meaning that the latent variable at time t-2 ( !!! ) exerts no direct influence on latent variable at time t ( ! ); 5) the measurement error variance is assumed to be constant over time
8 I estimate this model in Stata 12 using the variance-covariance matrix. Maximum likelihood was the method of estimation. Having more than three waves of panel data allows me to evaluate the fit of the model. The model performs well: RMSEA of 0.029 and CFI of .998 indicate a good fit (Acock, 2013) . Although ! is statistically significant (suggesting less than perfect fit), it is not a major problem because ! can be a misleading measure of fit where sample size is large (such as in the present case where N = 2,147).
The Wiley and Wiley model also reports estimates of reliability of the measurement scale. The reliabilities for the confidence in the European Parliament scale range between .73 and .78. 9 The data are collected each year in December. The financial crisis began in Fall 2008. 10 All equations in this section are adapted from Cameron and Triverdi (2010) . 11 I use one-step Arellano-Bond estimator. All available lags are used as instruments for !,!!! . This means that all cases in the dataset that display at least three consecutive waves of data are included in the analysis. 12 Due to the estimation procedure (first differencing and then using the second lag of the dependent variable as an instrument), only dummy variables for waves 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the panel are included in the model. 13 The Arellano-Bond estimator assumes that there is no serial correlation in errors. A violation of this assumption would be indicated by a significant test statistic in the second-order autocorrelation test (this test statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 2 ). In both models of support for the European Parliament as well as in the model of support for democracy, the test statistic is sufficiently small (and therefore not statistically significant). The models of confidence in the European Parliament therefore satisfy this assumption. The test statistic for the model of support for the Dutch government is statistically significant, indicating violation of this assumption. However, the test statistic depends on sample size and it easily becomes statistically significant when the sample size is large (as in the present case). 14 There may be a concern that the relationship between evaluations of the economy and support for the European Union is affected by endogeneity. It is possible that there is a third variable that affects both evaluations of the economy and support for the EU. In order to alleviate this concern, I estimate an Arellano-Bond model in which the variable economic evaluations is viewed as an endogenous variable. Instead of using the current level of satisfaction with the economy as a predictor, the model uses the first lag of satisfaction with the economy as a predictor. 
